Abstract: While the endorsement of universalistic values by the New Left led to a first transformation of political space in Western Europe, the counter-mobilization of the extreme populist right resulted in a second transformation in the 1990s. This article focuses on the discursive innovations and normative foundations that have driven the emergence of a conflict opposing libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values. An analysis using data from the media coverage of election campaigns confirms that the New Left and the populist right represent polar normative ideals in France, Austria, and Switzerland. A similar transformation of political space occurred in the absence of a rightwing populist party in Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands. In these contexts, I hypothesize the value conflict to prove less durable and polarizing in the longer run. The analysis of an election in the mid-2000s confirms that party systems evolve in a path dependent manner in the two contexts. 
fading of established partisan loyalties, these new conflicts have been represented by political parties. In this article, I focus on the programmatic innovations of parties and the consequent reshaping of the conflicts represented by party systems at the turn of the century. Furthermore, I assess how durable conflicts centring on cultural liberalism, immigration policies, and European integration are likely to be. In this respect, persisting differences in the nature of conflicts in different countries are to be expected as a result of the way cultural conflicts transformed party systems early on.
The theoretical part of this article provides an account of how New Left and New
Right parties have driven the emergence of a new value conflict. The first transformation, which took place in the 1970s, involved the emergence of an opposition between culturally libertarian and traditionalist or authoritarian values. In a second transformation, this conflict has come to centre more explicitly on differing conceptions of community. In normative terms, I argue that libertarian-universalistic and traditionalist-communitarian values form opposing normative ideals and conceptions of justice. Empirically, these two conceptions come to lie at opposing poles of a new dimension of political conflict in West European party systems in the 1990s. With reference to the non-economic content of this dimension, I will refer to it as the new cultural divide. With the traditional distributional conflict well and alive, this results in a two-dimensional competitive space. In France, Switzerland, and Austria, extreme right-wing populist parties have triggered the manifestation of the new cultural divide, while it has emerged as a result of the strategic moves of the established parties in Germany, Britain, and the Netherlands. Whether or not a rightwing populist party was able to entrench itself in the crucial phase of the late-1980s or early-1990s has important implications for the durability and for the virulence of the new cultural conflict, however.
These claims are empirically verified in an analysis of the dimensionality of political space in the 1970s, the 1990s, and the first years of the new millennium. This inquiry relies on data on party positions derived from the news coverage of election campaigns. This article extends earlier analyses (Kriesi et al. 2006 to a more recent election in each of the six countries, and allows parties and issues to be located in the political space by means of Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). Using this data, I
investigate how the dimensions underlying political competition have evolved between the 1970s and the mid-2000s.(1) This allows me to assess, first, how resilient the cultural conflicts will prove, and second, to verify the frequent claim that they are likely to be integrated into the traditional left-right dimension.
The article is structured as follows. After a brief discussion of the forces underlying recent evolutions in West European party systems, I focus on the ideologies that parties have used to mobilize the new cultural conflict. Section two develops hypotheses on how the new conflicts are likely to manifest themselves in the transformation of political space, depending on the context of the national party system. I then present the research design and the data used in the empirical analysis, the results of which are presented in the final section. The analysis will allow an overtime tracking of the two-fold transformation of political space. Given the postulated divergence between party systems in the 2000s, and because this data has hitherto not been analyzed, I will put special emphasis on the patterns of opposition in the most recent contest.
The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe
There is some disagreement regarding the sources of the recent transformations of West European party systems. As pointed out by Enyedi and Deegan-Krause in the introduction to this issue, parallel to the dealignment of traditional class and religious cleavages, there are also processes of realignment that are driven by new structural antagonisms. As pointed out by Allardt (1968) early on, the educational revolution of the 1960s has spurred a growing diffusion of universalistic outlooks that citizens with more traditionalist values and conceptions of community are likely to see as threatening. On the other hand, Kriesi et al. (2006 argue that the educational revolution interacts with processes of denationalization or globalization to create "winners" and "losers" of the modernization processes of the past decades (on these two views see also the contributions by Dolezal and by Stubager, this issue).
One may debate the relative contribution of economic modernization, spurred by globalization, and cultural modernization since the late 1960s in party system change.
As a result of these evolutions certain social groups have lost in terms of life-chances or privileges, while others feel threatened in their identity by the policies enacting universalistic values and by European integration. One of the most striking outcomes of these large-scale changes has been that the resulting political potentials have at least until recently not been mobilized in economic terms. Rather, they have been tied to cultural conflicts that emerged in the aftermath of 1968. In this contribution, I leave the evolving structural underpinnings of party choices in Western Europe aside for the moment. Instead, I focus on the political conflicts themselves that have triggered these processes of dealignment and realignment. If cleavages involve social structural groups with shared identities that allow them to act collectively, as defined by Bartolini and Mair (1990) , then ideologies are likely to play a dual role from a cleavage perspective. On the one hand, conflict along established divisions keeps alive existing collective identities and thereby perpetuates alignments between social groups and parties. Novel ideologies, on the other hand, are crucial in the political articulation of new potentials rooted in an evolving social structure. Common social structural positions are unlikely to result in collective identifications as a matter of course. Instead, the latter are to some degree shaped from above by political actors that seek to establish durable links between themselves and segments of society (Bornschier forthcoming a).
In the late 1960s and 1970s, new political issues came up that had more to do with values and life-styles than with traditional, distributional conflicts. The mobilization of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s -fighting, for example, for feminist and gay rights, for the right to abortion and for the recognition of minorities and alternative life-styles -brought these new issues onto the political agenda, resulting in a two-dimensional structure in West European party systems, as Kitschelt (1994) has shown. Cutting across the "old" distributional axis, a cultural line of conflict opposing libertarian and authoritarian values had come to structure the attitudes of voters. On the political left, the prominence of cultural liberalism has given rise to the establishment of Ecologist parties and a transformation of a number of Social Democratic parties early on in the 1980s.
An opposing set of norms and values that constituted a counter-potential to the libertarian movements was detectable at the attitudinal level early on in Western publics (Sacchi 1998) . Its political manifestation, however, was delayed as compared to that of the New Left. The discomfort with the cultural changes brought about by the New Left was essentially conservative, and ideologically diffuse (see also Flanagan and Lee 2003) . Consequently, the political manifestation of the anti-universalistic potential was less the result of a grass-roots mobilization in social movements, as had been the case for the New Left, but depended more heavily on political leadership. In particular, political actors had to find specific issues around which a common identity could be established and that could serve to mobilize the traditionalist potential. In the 1990s, right-wing populist parties in a number of European countries succeeded in putting themes on the political agenda that disrupted older collective identities based on class and religion. This is important since the mobilization space of new conflicts is conditioned by the political identities tied to the established cleavages (Bornschier forthcoming a). As a consequence, and despite their diverse origins, right-wing populist parties have converged on a programmatic profile that involves two elements: First, they challenge the societal changes brought about by the libertarian left, and question the legitimacy of political decisions that enact universalistic values.
Second, and more importantly, the populist right has promoted new issues and developed new discourses, for example concerning immigration. This does not involve ethnic racism, but rather what Betz (2004) and Betz and Johnson (2004) have called "differentialist nativism" or "cultural differentialism", which represents a counter-vision to multicultural models of society.
The early literature emphasized the diversity of ideological appeals of parties of the extreme right (e.g., Kitschelt and McGann 1995) , and while some of these differences can be shown to persist (e.g., Golder 2003 , Carter 2005 , Cole 2005 , Mudde 2007 ), the successful exponents of this group have converged on the programmatic profile outlined above. By virtue of their specific programmatic profile, as well a number of further attributes, extreme right-wing populist parties represent a common party family that forms an ideologically more moderate sub-group of the broader extreme right category (Bornschier forthcoming a).(2) While the New Left has triggered a first transformation of political space in the 1970s and 1980s, the mobilization of the populist right has thus been the driving force of a second transformation. Depending on the country, the latter took place either in the late 1980s or in the 1990s, as the analysis will show (see also Kriesi et al. 2006) .
As a result, the issues advocated by the New Left and the populist right now lie at opposing poles of a new line of conflict that I propose to label libertarianuniversalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian.(3) This opposition is, at heart, a conflict over the role of community. It is at the centre of the well-known philosophical debate between liberals and communitarians, opposing individualist and communitarian conceptions of the person. As communitarians such as Walzer (1983) and Taylor (1992) argue, universalistic principles may violate cultural traditions within an established community. If humans are inherently social beings, the application of universalistic principles may lead to political solutions that clash with established and widely shared cultural practices. Communitarians urge us to acknowledge the fact that our identities are grounded in cultural traditions, and that an individualistic conception of the self is misconceived.
Although many communitarian thinkers only propose a (more or less modest) communitarian corrective to liberal universalism, this debate has provided theoretical grounds for a more far-reaching critique of the universalistic principles advocated by Rawls (1971) . Philosophical currents of the European New Right have borrowed from communitarian conceptions of community and justice in their propagation of the concept of "cultural differentialism", claiming not the superiority of any nationality or race, but instead stressing the right of peoples to preserve their distinctive traditions.
In turn, this discourse has proved highly influential for right-wing populist parties (Antonio 2000 , Minkenberg 2000 , Birnbaum 1996 . Immigration is directly linked to Consequently, we can expect differences in the lines of conflict that structure political space that stem from the configuration of the party system. But the resulting dimensionality of political space is open to yet another source of variation. If voter preferences are more than one-dimensional, then the dimensionality of the party political space will depend on the specific way parties combine positions along the relevant lines of conflict (see also Stoll's analysis of "raw" and "effective" partydefined spaces, this issue). If party positions along the cultural line of conflict were to coincide with their stances regarding the state-market cleavage, a one-dimensional political space would emerge. The more party positions on the two dimensions diverge, on the other hand, the more strongly two-dimensional the resulting political space will be.
Research Design
The ensuing analysis focuses on six countries, namely, France, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, Germany, and Britain. These countries differ with respect to many institutional, societal and political characteristics, such as their size or regarding their political institutions. For all these differences, I expect similar cultural conflicts to have asserted themselves since the late-1960s due to social changes characteristic of advanced industrial countries. Consequently, we should be able to witness a similar two-fold transformation of political space. The analysis starts by looking at 1970s elections in the six countries, where I expect the first transformation to have occurred.
I then move to the first election in the late-1980s or early-1990s for which data is available in order to trace the second transformation. Despite the basic commonality of the development in the six countries, I also expect differences between them. The party system filters the mobilization of political potentials, and different actors are likely to be the driving forces of the transformations. This is likely to have implications for the capacity of the cultural divide to "freeze" party systems, and the six countries present some interesting variation in this respect: A new party of the populist right has emerged in France, Switzerland and Austria, but not in Germany, the Netherlands, or Britain. Fresh data from the most recent election in each country serves to assess whether conflicts evolve differently in these two contexts.
To identify the lines of conflict structuring political competition, I use media data based on an analysis of parties' "political offer" in election campaigns. In each country, all articles related to the electoral contest or politics in general were selected from a quality newspaper and a tabloid, covering the last two months before Election Kleinnijenhuis and Pennings 2001 ; for a fuller description of the coding procedure and data used for the present article, see Dolezal 2008) . The choice of this data has advantages as well as disadvantages. Newspapers often have a specific partisan bias, and may give more room to some contenders and less to others. This would above all be a problem for an analysis based exclusively on issue saliency, however. Partisan bias is far less problematic for the coding scheme used here, which determines party positions in terms of a positive or negative direction of parties concerning issues. The data predominantly captures statements that party exponents make at press conferences and on other occasions, and it is unlikely that newspapers twist these statements to a degree that affects the validity of the measurement.
The advantages of this data over expert survey data are clear. Because small political formations such as right-wing populist parties may not have marked profiles concerning all issue dimensions, expert surveys risk to produce data that is biased by theoretical expectations regarding parties' positions. An obvious disadvantage of the campaign data compared to that based on manifestoes (Budge et al. 2001 , Klingemann et al. 2006 ) is that is covers only a relatively limited time-span. There is an important advantage over both alternative data sources, however, being that the campaign data more closely reflects what voters actually learn of the parties' positions. The data is therefore more situational, which is advantageous for the scope of this analysis. Because the populist right has succeeded in setting the media agenda in recent years, it has forced even those parties to take positions regarding immigration and traditionalist-communitarian values that were more occupied with other issues. In these cases, deriving positional measures from saliency is potentially misleading. Hence, the media data offer information both on the position of parties regarding issues, as well as on their relative salience. Using Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling, both are taken into account to create graphical representations of political space.
The political issues put forward by parties in these campaigns are regrouped into 12 broader categories that relate to the research questions at hand. In the following, the content of these categories is specified. All categories have a clear direction, and actor's stance towards them can be either positive or negative. The abbreviations in brackets refer to the ones used in the figures later on:
Economic issues -Welfare: Expansion of the welfare state and defence against welfare state retrenchment. Tax reforms that have redistributive effects, employment and health care programs.
-Budget: Budgetary rigor and tax reductions that have no redistributive effects.
-Economic liberalism (ecolib): Opposition to market regulation, support for deregulation, for more competition, and privatisation. -Culture: Support for education, culture, and scientific research.
-Immigration: Support for a tough immigration and integration policy, and for the restriction of the number of foreigners.
-Army: Support for a strong national defence and for nuclear weapons.
-Security: Support for more law and order, fight against criminality.
Residual categories -Environment (eco): Calls for environmental protection, opposition to atomic energy.
-Institutional reform (iref): Support for various institutional reforms such as the extension of direct democratic rights or calls for the efficiency of the public administration.
-Infrastructure (infra): Support for the improvement of the infrastructure.
The grouping of the issues into economic, cultural, and residual categories is provided for illustrative purposes only and does not determine the analysis. The distances between parties and issue categories are analysed separately for each country and for each election using Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). The MDS technique first assesses how many dimensions are necessary to represent the parties and issues, using as few dimensions as possible. Having determined the dimensionality, the method then represents objects graphically according to the proximity between them (see Coxon 1982 , Rabinowitz 1975 . It is important to note that the only information conveyed in the resulting configurations is the relative proximity between objects (i.e., the absolute distances in the figures cannot be Employing Weighted Metric Multidimensional Scaling ensures, however, that the distances with respect to salient issues or parties will be more accurate than less salient ones. While it is intuitively plausible that the representation of the competitive political space should mirror the most salient conflicts in the party system, this procedure has one drawback: Parties may misleadingly be located in proximity to issues they are not in favour of, but did not strongly voice an opinion on, because these distances will play a minor role in determining the political space resulting from MDS. For these reasons, it is indispensable occasionally to refer to the original, In all elections under study, political space proves to be clearly two-dimensional, since the move from a one-dimensional to a two-dimensional representation results in the clearest improvement in the goodness-of-fit of the solution. A constant finding across countries and elections is that an antagonism between welfare provision and economic liberalism emerges as the political manifestation of the state-market cleavage forms one of these dimensions. While the traditional distributive conflict thus remains polarizing -or indeed in many instances has become more polarized than was the case in the 1970s -, the second dimension of opposition in political space has been subject to change. In the following, I focus primarily on this transformation.
Because the results reveal a common evolution in terms of the impact of cultural conflicts on political space from the 1970s to the 1990s, but a divergence thereafter, I
present figures that present a cross-sectional view of political space at three timepoints, namely, the mid-1970s, the late-1980s or early-1990s, and the 2000s. For reasons of space, I will focus rather narrowly on the core hypotheses advanced in the theoretical section and omit a discussion of the location of the other issue categories and less relevant parties.
In the 1970s, cultural liberalism, which regroups the issues relating to the goals of the New Social Movements, has appeared on the political agenda, as Figures 1 and 2 show. The libertarian-universalistic pole of the new cultural divide already structures party positions in all six countries. Except for Switzerland, this category occupies a rather extreme position, which is an indicator of polarization. Generally, Socialist or Social Democrat parties of the left most strongly endorse these goals, indicating that they have undergone a New Left transformation. This is the case of the PSF in France, the SPD in Germany, the SPÖ in Austria, and to a more limited degree of the Labour Party in Britain. While the Dutch PvdA occupies a similar position, it already faces competition from new parties mobilizing universalistic values, namely the Green-Left party and D66. The entry of competitors within the New Left has thus occurred early in the Netherlands, but the other countries have followed suit, as we shall see later.
Finally, in Germany, the SPD's liberal democrat coalition partner occupies a position in similar vicinity to cultural liberalism and the same is true of the Christian Democrats in Switzerland.
Figures 1 & 2 about here
Depending on the country, the counter-pole of the cultural dimension is formed either by budgetary rigor, support for the army, or by law and order stances ("security"), or by a combination of these. The antagonism between cultural liberalism and budgetary rigor may be interpreted as a neo-conservative anti-state position, which is liberal in economic terms and traditionalist in cultural matters (see Habermas 1985 , Eatwell 1989 . Support for the army or law and order, on the other hand, reflects a traditionalist or authoritarian position that is in line with the expectations set out regarding the nature of the cultural divide in the 1970s.
Conservative parties lie closest to the authoritarian or traditionalist pole, most clearly in the cases of the CDU in Germany and the Gaullist RPR in France. In the Netherlands, the liberal VVD and CDA lie furthest away from cultural liberalism, but their traditionalist position is less clear-cut than in the countries just discussed, and the same is true of the Conservatives in Britain. Note that in both countries, there is an issue category that lies even further away than security, but this is not due to strong polarization, but rather to the fact that all parties reject European integration in the British and a strong army in the Dutch case (see the party positions in the Appendix). The ÖVP's ability to force the FPÖ into a rather liberal economic policy, which goes against the preferences of the latter's core constituencies, goes part of the way in explaining the FPÖ's subsequent losses.
The Swiss configuration is a partial exception to the pattern found in France and Austria due to the extraordinary role that conflicts over Europe has played in the 1991 election, one year before the referendum regarding membership in the European Economic Area. Its staunch opposition against European integration has catalyzed the success of the Swiss People's Party (SVP), and in this election, Europe forms the counter-pole to traditionalism and communitarianism. Cultural liberalism lies at a similar distance from the immigration category, but the antagonism formed by these two issues runs parallel and therefore overlaps completely with the state-market dimension. The fact that support for European integration and cultural liberalism do not go hand-in-hand, as we would expect, is due to the fact that European integration faced opposition both from the populist right and from the Ecologists in this election.
Despite their clearly libertarian-universalistic profile, the Swiss Greens initially opposed forging closer bonds with the EU because they were concerned that this would dilute Switzerland's achievements in environmental protection. This has also led members of this party family in Scandinavia to oppose European integration (Jahn 1999, Johansson and Raunio 2001) . In later elections, however, the Swiss Ecologists rallied behind a pro-European position in the later contests, and the Swiss configuration comes to resemble the continental European mainstream, as we shall see.
As mentioned, the British political space in the early-1990s, shown in Figure 4 , still resembles that of the 1974 election due to the absence of the immigration issue.
In the two other countries that have not seen successful right-wing populist challengers, on the other hand, a transformation of political space similar to that in France, Austria, and Switzerland has occurred. This is consequent of the adoption of the immigration issue by established parties of the right, similarly to what had already occurred in the early 1980s (Ignazi 2003) . Confronted with large numbers of migrants and refugees from Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavia, and with a wave of extreme right activism and violence, the German Union parties argued that the "threshold of tolerance" and of the capacity to assimilate foreigners had been reached.
While calling for a more restrictive immigration policy, the Union's position is somewhat less extreme than that of the populist right in other countries, and not that different from that of the Social Democrats. The latter have clearly abandoned the universalistic position they had held in the seventies. In the German case, the resulting centripetal pattern of competition between the two major parties contained the salience of the immigration issue, and helped to inhibit the emergence of a right-wing populist party (Bornschier forthcoming a) . In the Netherlands, the VVD is both most distant from cultural liberalism and most strongly calls for a tough immigration The results so far thus confirm the proposition that the issues put on the political agenda by the New Left and of the populist right constitute polar normative ideals. At the same time, the basic structure of political space is similar whether or not a rightwing populist party has established itself. This is due to the divisions over cultural liberalism on the one hand, and to the emergence of the immigration issue as a counter-pole to cultural liberalism in all cases except for Britain. Yet, even if the Dutch VVD and the German Union parties showed some reluctance concerning libertarian universalism and favoured tough immigration policies in the mid-1990s, neither of them qualifies as a member of the right-wing populist party family. Clearly, they lack the anti-establishment discourse typical of the populist right and have retained a pluralist party organization. And there is an important further difference:
Because the populist right thrives on the hard core of the traditionalist-communitarian voter potential, it will scarcely survive a moderation of its discourse. Mainstream parties of the right, on the other hand, have more leeway to abandon those elements of the populist right's discourse they adopted either to outbid their mainstream right competitors, or to crowd out extreme right-wing populist parties. The discussion over immigration and asylum seekers was there to grasp in the 1990s and this therefore constituted a crucial phase with long-term implications. The hypothesis that the nature of cultural conflicts differs depending on whether or not a right-wing populist party succeeded in breaking into party systems is verified in the most recent electoral contest.
The latest elections covered by the campaign data took place roughly twelve years after those just discussed, and almost twenty in the case of France due to the length of presidential terms. As before, I start with the discussion of the Austrian, Swiss and election is no longer typical of successful right-wing populist parties, which may well explain its meagre electoral showing. Another new party, the "List Dr. Martin" seems to mobilize outside the dominant dimensions of opposition with its calls for political transparency, democracy, and justice. Compared to earlier contests, the ÖVP has changed its strategy vis-à-vis its right-wing populist competitors, and has come to occupy a more universalistic position. The ÖVP is less supportive of cultural liberalism than the SPÖ and much less so than the Ecologists, however, and its somewhat unexpected location is due its position on Europe (see Appendix). In a campaign in which debates over Europe centred on Turkey's accession to the Union, the ÖVP remained the only party supportive of the integration process.
In France, the Front National retains a distinctive position at the traditionalistcommunitarian pole of the cultural divide. The most interesting evolution here concerns the mainstream parties, whose positions have evolved considerably. In (6) Finally, in the Netherlands a successful right-wing populist party is also absent.
The List Pim Fortuyn did compete in this election, but it received almost no media coverage. More importantly, due to Fortuyn's adherence to universalistic values, the LPF's programmatic position in earlier elections differed significantly from that of right-wing populist parties. This finding emerges both from an analysis based on the media data also employed in this article (Bornschier forthcoming a), as well as in Pennings and Keman's (2003) analysis based on manifesto data. Geert Wilders' Freedom Party may qualify as a member of the extreme right-wing populist party family, but again, it has not received sufficient media coverage in order to locate it in political space. At first sight, the Dutch configuration is peculiar in that cultural liberalism and anti-immigration stances do not form a dimension, but are both situated above the state-market divide. This is due to all parties, with the exception of the VVD, rejecting tough immigration policies. Even the VVD has tempered its position compared to its firm anti-immigrant stance throughout the 1990s. Parties differ in significant ways with respect to cultural liberalism, however. In conjuncture with the lack of differentiation regarding immigration policies, this explains the somewhat unusual location of the immigration category. PvdA, SP and VVD subscribe to the universalistic principles embodied in the cultural liberalism category, while the Christian Democrat CDA opposes them (the D66 has received insufficient coverage in the media to determine its position). In other words, none of the mayor parties exhibits a consistently traditionalist-communitarian position.
Party positions along the state-market dimension differ more, on the other hand.
While the VVD remains the most market liberal party, the CDA took a similarly freemarket position in this election. But the main dynamic takes place on the political left:
Despite the PvdA remaining firmly anchored on the left, the Socialist Party (SP) opposes economic liberalism even more fervently. GroenLinks (GL) is situated similarly, but differs in its emphasis, above all opposing budgetary rigor. Just like in Germany, the absence of a right-wing populist party seems have resulted in the statemarket dimension regaining importance in the most recent Dutch elections, in which the Socialist Party more than doubled its voter share. In Germany, the decline of cultural conflicts results from the deliberate strategies of the established left and right, involving a polarization to crowd out the extreme right whenever the immigration issue emerged, but centripetal competition whenever it was off the agenda (see Bornschier forthcoming a). In the Netherlands, the major parties also colluded after the success of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (see , but the inability of a right-wing populist party to entrench itself also seems to result from the failures of these parties themselves.
Conclusion
Covering thirty years of party politics in six West European countries, the findings presented in this article clearly reject the hypothesis that politics after the decline of the historical cleavages is shaped by rapidly evolving issue agendas and populism.
Rather, the transformation witnessed by these party systems within the last three decades reflect, first, the rising diffusion of universalistic values since the 1960s, resulting in societal changes that have triggered a first redrawing of political space. (Kitschelt and McGann 1995 , Abedi 2002 , Luebbers et al. 2002 , Carter 2005 . Crowding out the populist right occurs as a conjuncture of the established right temporarily taking a tough stance on immigration, and the established left avoiding ideological stretching, thereby downplaying the immigration issue. My account is thus more in line with Meguid's (2005) approach.
Partly as a consequence of the decline of the cultural conflict, economic issues have proven more important in structuring recent party divisions in Germany and the Netherlands, and have given rise to significant parties off the left-wing mainstream.
Given the fact that the modernization processes of the past decades have been both economic and cultural, and have created "winners" and "losers" in both terms, this is hardly surprising. So far, however, party systems with firmly entrenched right-wing populist parties have escaped this dynamic, and it is likely that politics will continue to evolve in a path-dependent manner in the two contexts. It is too early to judge which of the two camps Britain is likely to adhere to in the future. The Conservatives have put harsher immigration stances on the political agenda and have also mobilized widespread Eurosceptic sentiments, but the absence of a right-wing competitor leaves either of the two routes open to them -that followed by the Union parties in Germany or the one chosen by the Swiss People's Party.
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(2) Extreme right-wing populist parties from the 1990s on can be distinguished from other parties by virtue of three commonalities: (i) a location at the traditionalistcommunitarian extreme of the new cultural divide; (ii) a populist anti-establishment discourse, in which they draw a dividing line between themselves and the established parties, and (iii) a hierarchical internal structure which sets them apart from pluralist parties. It is only for the sake of brevity that I occasionally drop the label "extreme" in identifying these parties.
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